ly affected sanctioned state -controlled banks, oil, gas and arms companies by severely constraining foreign funding and have indirectly affected non-sanctioned companies by -($160-170bn) due to Russian companies' self -adjustment, which is evidenced by their utili zation of foreign assets accumulated earlier for debt repayment and an overall decrease by 2017, compared with a hypothetical scenario with no sanctions) but 3.3 times lower than the estimated effects of the oil price shock.
Introduction
In March 2014, the EU, the U.S. and a number of other states introduced and restricted Russian oil and gas companies' access to advanced production techno logies. In response, Russia imposed an embargo on a wide range of agribe no chance of the sanctions being lifted any time soon, although the situation in Ukraine has somewhat stabilized: in June 2015, the EU announced the extension of the sanctions until at least the end of the year (and in December 2015, they were further prolonged until July 31 st , 2016 at the very least), while the U.S. actually expanded the list of companies falling under its sectoral sanctions. In turn, Russia prolonged its food embargo for another year.
still has been no convincing evaluation of their effects, and there is no consen-1 although IMF (2015) report on the Russian economy indicates that the sanctions and retaliatory sanctions may lead Russia to experience a reduction in GDP of 1.0%-1.5% over the short term, although the accumulated loss may reach 9.0% of GDP over -tions between 8% and 10% of Russia's GDP but posit that compensating measures -cate the time horizon over which this effect may be achieved (Shirov et al., 2015) . assessed rather tentatively: these authors assumed only that Russia's private sector lost all access to the foreign capital markets. Rautava (2014) and Vercueil (2014) study (published before the sectoral sanctions were adopted) estimated the impact as a 1 p.p. reduction in the 2014 GDP growth rate (Rautava, 2014) . The second gradually lifted, GDP would grow an additional 2 p.p. in 2015 than it would unof Russia's retaliatory sanctions on public welfare: based on their static model, the authors estimated a reduction of 0.25%. ties in the private sector decreased by USD 37 billion, which sharply contrasted -tors that are driven by economic logic, whereas in this case, the drop occurred due to administrative restrictions.
First, we evaluate the impact of the sanctions on the basic components of capital from Russia. Then, we conduct a scenario analysis (for the medium term)
indicators. We assume that there are only limited effects over the medium term with respect to oil and gas sanctions (due to reduced production) and technological sanctions (due to slower productivity growth caused by problems with importing dual-use -investment and consumption, is also noted in other works (IMF, 2015; Sinyakov et al., 2015; Shirov et al., 2015) . Unlike these studies, our research presents a more detailed analysis of the impact of sanctions on basic macroeconomic indicators as well as on the components of the balance of payments. owned companies in the fuel/energy sector (Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft) -there are the more severe SDN sanctions that prohibit foreign exchange payments (affecting banks and companies whose owners were subjected to personal sanctions). Second, many Russian banks are affected by the so-called "soft" sanctions, which means stricter technical control over transactions that typically slows "stage" of their impact on the economy) are considered by Ulyukaev and Mau Increasing uncertainty (beginning even before the sectoral sanctions were introduced) slows down consumption due to rising precautionary savings (often in USD) and dwindling investments due to higher risk premiums; investment opportunities for companies. Moreover, restrictions on technology exports to the Russian Federation constrain the potential growth of total factor productivity; and Production in sectors dependent on imported components suffers from the ruble 's sharp fall. global capital markets during the preceding period. In 2006, the main restric-3% and 6% of GDP.
In the end, by the time the sanctions were imposed, borrowers had accumulated -of Russia, 12% of the total amount consisted of short-term debt that was to be repaid within a year, with over 25% of such debt in the banking sector. Notably, at that moment, the assets accumulated by Russian economic agents exceeded ted among the various sectors: banks and the public sector had positive net assets sector had negative net assets (-USD 318 billion).
restrictions on credit to Russian borrowers are having substantial additional implications that should also be taken into account to evaluate the full effect of sanctions. Direct effects mean restrictions placed on the foreign borrowings of Russian Source system, which has actually become a single marketplace. For example, the likeli--from U.S. regulators. Indirect effects. The persistent geopolitical tension, the potential for new sanctions or an expanded interpretation of existing sanctions by U.S. and EU regulators, in addition to the chance that Russia will impose changes to the "rules of the game" (e.g., restrictions on capital transactions) are viewed by investors as an important source of additional economic risk. Thus, the attractiveness of issuers that are subject to the sanctions, the indirect effects have more compo--Reaction to the sanctions. The direct and indirect effects that prevent foreign
The "affected" issuers can react to the sanctions in a number of ways, ranging from buying in domestic foreign exchange market funds to repay the debt, to sellan important role in determining the overall estimated effects of the sanctions. Second-order effects involve changes in key macroeconomic indicators (exchange rates, prices, exports and imports, etc.) in response to reduced net capipayments by means of a combination of an increase in the current account and -justments were considered by Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2013) , who note, in parsupply rather than on domestic demand. the aforementioned channels. For example, it is clear that a sharp decrease in -banks on the sanction list may be caused by both direct and indirect effects, i.e., the unwillingness of countries that did not impose sanctions to lend to them due to their concerns about the potential negative reactions by U.S. and EU regu--the amount of foreign debt securities and public banks' syndicated loans was re-duced by USD 11.2 billion during the second half of 2014 2 . This result demonstrates that those banks and companies affected by the sanctions were, to a great -ties in the banking sector dropped by USD 30.8 billion during the second half of --creased by more than USD 15 billion despite the fact that the major companies affected by the sanctions (e.g., Rosneft and Gazpromneft) had no foreign debt securities to be repaid during that period. USD 83.6 billion and that of banks and companies that were more than 50% publicly owned fell by USD 41.1 billion (without considering liabilities to direct the contribution of transactions and FX revaluation to changes in foreign debt by basis, the effect for private banks and companies (those not directly affected by the sanctions) is at least comparable to that for public companies, even if only channels of the sanctions' impact, which include, in particular, the decreased -of 2015 against the background of generally increasing uncertainty concerning the prospects for the Russian economy related to falling oil prices, and this rate remains close to zero for the banking sector.
Notably, indirect reactions to the sanctions include reduced gross capital in-2 approximately 1 / 5 of the foreign debt of Russian issuers is denominated in rubles). which was likely due to concerns about the possibility of Western sanctions and -Russia's sovereign rating, which was likely to have automatically led to sales of securities by many institutional investors.
investing in Russian assets, the sanctions also resulted in changes to the decisions made by Russian banks and companies regarding investment in foreign assets, i.e., in an active reaction. This effect was most noticeable during the third by USD 29.9 billion in anticipation of major foreign debt repayments during asset accumulation slowed abruptly (both in terms of direct and portfolio invest--chandise trade, etc.").
2015
3 ), as well as for similar periods from preceding years. These data show the effects of the sanctions. The magnitude of these changes depends on many 3 We will call this period the "sanction period" for brevity. factors, such as export revenues (most importantly) as well as the exchange rate, interest rates, investment demand, etc. Next, we examine the basic factors that must be taken into account in evaluating the effects of the sanctions:
also by falling oil prices and the associated revised forecasts of the prospects and investment attractiveness of the Russian economy;
to some experts' estimates) is related to funds transferred from Russian compabe explained not only by the reaction to the sanctions but also by the measures --explained by changes in the variables generally used in the models by leading those in developed countries and, second, the VIX volatility index calculated by Thus, to correctly evaluate the effects of the sanctions, we must distinguish between their effects and those of other factors. The general approach applied Table 4 Certain components of the balance of payments (USD billion).
Sector
July 2010 period, which means that we calculated values that might have been observed without the sanctions but with the actual values of the rest of the exogenous indicators (such as oil prices and the foreign debt repayment schedule). We view determining the estimated effects because the combination of sanctions, falling -was not consistent with the fundamentals (i.e., a clear overshooting occurred), turn, had a positive feedback with the demand for foreign exchange cash, leadIn other words, the situation at the end of 2014 was caused not only (and not to the greatest extent) by the combination of objectively measured economic factors
In the end, for purposes of evaluating the effects for 2014 (more precisely, 2014, whereas the simulations for 2015 through 2017 were based on the calculated values of deviation for the components of the balance of payments from prices (3Q 2014), the passing of the price "trough", the very high uncertainty regarding economic prospects (1Q 2015), a slight rebound in prices and reduced -discussed "background" volatility of indicators do not allow the analysis to be this manner offer only a general view of the extent of the sanctions' effects.
indicators, which is to be performed in the second stage, must consider that the effects of the sanctions immediately lead to deviations from the "normal" trajectory value compared with the hypothetical "normal" scenario. For this reason, we built -scription of the potential development trajectory without the sanctions and assuming continuously high oil prices (at USD 100 per barrel). In the second version, at every step, the foreign capital not received as a result of the sanctions is deducted. The macroeconomic indicators are then found for the next step, the capital not received is again calculated and deducted, etc. Comparing the indicators for the two versions provides an evaluation of the sanctions' effects.
We also consider two additional scenarios that are characterized by reduced oil prices (between USD 50 and USD 53 per barrel) and that correspond to 4 Considering these scenarios enables us to evaluate the effects of falling oil prices and the sanctions separately, with high and low oil prices. Thus, we can understand whether any synergy occurs when the two negative factors are combined, or if their effects are just added to one another.
We now consider each of the separate components of the balance of payments under the sanctions.
Changes in debt liabilities
To determine the impact of the sanctions on foreign debt liabilities, we used gra dually decreasing. We believe that this trend can be explained by the reduction in investment demand under conditions of decreasing (see Fig. 2 ) expected growth rates for the Russian economy (and for growth in domestic demand, ac-4 http://economy.gov.ru/minec/about/structure/depMacro/20151026. Source: IMF.
on oil prices, GDP, expected economic growth rates, etc. It should be noted that lower predictability of the ruble's exchange rate. fdi_in was determined based on the economic development prospects that we characterized using IMF growth forecasts for the current year (gdp_gf gdp_g (-1), or the year preceding d_2013q1 was added to take into acof 2015 (this estimate is used in the medium-term simulation below). The tenta- ter for which report data are available). The average estimate is low in terms of absolute value; in fact, we consider this component of the overall effect of -ther calculations.
Changes in the foreign liabilities of the public sector
This indicator is relatively stable when measured as a percentage of GDP.
(3,69) -see Fig. 6 ), which appears to have been caused by the downgrading of Russia's also caused by the sanctions against Russia, the main factor is most likely the drop This component of the balance of payments is determined mainly by GDP in U.S. dollar terms:
(8,79) (8,70)
Fig. 6. Portfolio Investment in Russian government bonds (USD billion).
Source:
of 2014 (see Fig. 7 ) and was, on average, USD 3.0 billion lower throughout urals -ment, probably through the channel of foreign investment by oil and gas companies: When estimating the effects of the sanctions in this case, it should be noted of 2014, due to the escalation of tensions in Ukraine and the pressure on the rua result, the increase in the respective assets was considerably higher than preforeign exchange cash was USD 4 billion higher than predicted. The valuations the period from 2015 through 2017, we do not include the effects of the sanctions in the form of increased foreign currency purchases for this period.
In our opinion, the trends for the other assets of the private sector (which in--panies to the sanctions. Thus, with respect to the banking sector, these assets de---sibly associated with initial concerns about introducing more severe sanctions, 
Source:
simulation, we ignored this volatility and simply assumed that the foreign assets other assets).
--Russian capital through this channel averaged 9.6% of goods and services extrend and the secondary effects of the sanctions, we assumed that the accumulation of other assets in our estimates decreases regardless of the sanctions. Thus, might result in slightly overestimating the overall impact of the sanctions.
Overall effect for 2014 and the sanction year
In Table 5 and Table 6 , we sum up the estimated effects of the sanctions on for direct investment and public sector liabilities were simply multiplied by four to put them into annual terms. We derived estimates for debt liabilities for 2014 - debt. In terms of foreign exchange cash, we also considered the effects of the un-
The analysis of these valuations demonstrates that the volume of transactions was - to the banking sector, 18% to the reduction in public sector liabilities and 54% to exceeded the direct effects of the lending restrictions on public banks and companies.
ted the net effect of the sanctions for 2014 as a whole (after taking into account annual terms (6.2% of the GDP).
this result is largely explained by methodological factors: as noted above, the down---timate the effects of the sanctions on "public sector liabilities" and "cash foreign only correspond to the second half of 2014, which is why the data in Table 4 can be understood on the whole as the minimum estimate for the impact of the sanc--this reduction is attributable to the banking sector, 11% to the drop in public sector -
The net effect of the sanctions (including reactions by Russian investors) is esti-

Evaluation of the sanctions' effects in the medium-term
(oil prices) and internal (GDP dynamics) factors that, in turn, depend on oil prices and sanctions. Therefore, estimates of the medium-term impact of the sanctions cannot be obtained independently: instead, step-by-step scenario calculations are -
Scenario assumptions
We considered several combinations of oil price dynamics and the effects of sanctions from 2015 through 2017 (see Table 7 ). For 2014, annual average oil The baseline scenario corresponds to the hypothetical version in which oil prices remain stable and no sanctions are imposed. The second scenario is a combination ---mates for the effect of falling oil prices without and with the sanctions.
rule out the possibility that they (particularly those imposed by the EU) will be extend if they remain. 
Calculations for 2015 through 2017
the impact (determined by comparing the scenarios) seemed plausible.
The EEG model on which the calculations are based is built upon econometric (including cointegrating) estimates of the relationships between the basic macroidentities connecting them. In particular, we can obtain estimates for the im-USD 160-170 billion over the period under review. Table 10 shows that these losses are approximately 2.5 times lower than the total losses from decreasing oil prices (by the end of the period, the losses from low oil prices are 4 times higher than account can only be compared notionally. It should also be noted that the impact of For reference: net effect from the sanctions as a percentage of GDP -2.9 -1.8 -1.4 -1.5 -1.9
Source: direct effects (through borrowing by banks and companies affected by the sanctions) as well as indirect effects related to the rest of the borrowers. If we notionally as--ment is, on average, 3.5% lower than in the scenario without sanctions from 2014 through 2017, while retail sales turnover is 2.6% lower (these calculations, in accordance with the estimates earlier obtained by the Economic Expert Group, falling oil prices have a more profound impact on investment (mainly due to proeliminated. The comparison of investment forecasts as of the end of the period in shocks) demonstrates that the sanctions reduced investment by 5% on the whole throughout the period, whereas falling oil prices reduced investment by 24%.
change rate (see Fig. 12 ). Thus, according to our estimates, the sanctions increased Note: low oil prices and the effects from falling oil prices with sanctions.
the exchange rate of the USD by approximately 6 rubles in 2015. This effect declines and, accordingly, improved balance of investment income (thus, by 2017, the impact of the sanctions on the annual average USD rate is estimated at as low as 2 rubles).
in the shock scenario (S). Nevertheless, the effects from reduced domestic demand prevail, as expected, and the GDP in scenarios without the sanctions is higher than in scenarios with the sanctions (see Fig. 13 ). Notably, the effect of both shocks remains -1.1 p.p. for falling oil prices). GDP losses that have accumulated over the period to the results obtained by Sinyakov et al. (2015) (0.5-0.6 p.p.) and, to the best of our judgment, are lower than the vaguely formulated IMF estimates (according to which, the effect would "initially" be 1.0-1.5 p.p. and 9 p.p. "in the medium-term"). It should be noted that the considerable decrease in GDP in response to falling economy. The real depreciation of the ruble due to deteriorating terms of trade only slightly increased the volume of exports (because they are dominated by oil and gas exports which are not particularly sensitive to the exchange rate) (see -cant effect on the supply of tradable domestic goods to the domestic market (see production of non-tradable goods resulting from falling domestic demand.
cording to estimates by E. Gurvich et al. (2014) , was 1.2 p.p. in 2014 and 0.8 p.p.
-2014 and 2015, whereas the combined effect on consumer prices is estimated at approximately 4% for the sanctions and 8% for falling oil prices. Comparing the accumulated growth of CPI for 2014 through 2017 reveals that the sanctions add 5.7 p.p. to it, whereas falling oil prices add 11.0 p.p.
years after the shocks) (see Fig. 15 ). Moreover, in 2014 and 2015, as a result of In other words, we are facing a paradox: -tions help the government overcome possibly the most painful consequences of , whose real value falls by almost 20% over two years, mainly due to cheaper oil. through 2017, based on the assumptions above, adjusting the balance of paydown to a mirroring increase in the current account. It consists of three main components: increased exports due to the stimulating effects of the weaker ruble; lower imports (also due to the overall contraction of domestic demand); and improved balance of investment income. The results presented in Table 11 showing the relative contribution of these components (i.e., comparing scenarios with and Prilepskiy, 2013) that imports play a considerably more important role in adjusting to external shocks than exports (the so-called "internal" mechanism the fact noted above that investment income improves over time under those scenarios with the sanctions. completely neutralizes the sanctions' impact on the real exchange rate (see - tions, i.e., that the medium-term effects of the sanction shock are weaker than GDP gain from the dynamics of net exports in scenarios with the sanctions will also be close to zero by 2017, and over the longer term, low oil prices are a sig--couraging import substitution than the sanctions. impact on economic development at low oil prices than at high oil prices (see Table 12 ). Similarly, the sanctions aggravate the impact of falling oil prices on the economy. This "synergy" emerges because similar reductions (in USD larger as a percentage of the GDP components (investment, consumption, etc.), which can be illustrated by a comparison between the bottom lines of Table 8 and Table 9 . particularly large.
Conclusion
1-2%). Moreover, at the beginning of the period, government revenues even grow in real terms.
the fall in oil prices the second case, there is mainly "passive" adjustment.
In particular, when speaking of real sector indicators, i.e., GDP, investment and retail sales, the effect of the sanctions has been increased by more than 50%.
considerable ability of the Russian economy to 2014 through 2017 will amount to 8% of 2013 GDP (with low oil prices), whereas the accumulated GDP losses (the total difference in output between the S and SS scenarios from 2014 through 2017) are estimated at 6 p.p. of 2013 GDP.
